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INTRODUCTION
Professor Julie Mead’s Article considers whether publicly funded
voucher programs “subvert” states’ ability to provide an “adequate”
public education consistent with state constitutional requirements.1

*

Professor, Cornell Law School.
1. Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling:
Examining Voucher Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 703 (2015).
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The critical analytic move in Mead’s Article involves characterizing
publicly funded voucher programs as a “discretionary option” and, in
contrast, a state’s duty to adequately fund traditional public schools as
a state constitutional “obligation.”2 Mead then argues that the growth
in the number of publicly funded voucher programs and the
accelerating participation rates in those programs threaten to dilute
states’ abilities to meet their constitutional obligations owed to
traditional public schools.3 Paradoxically, then, it is the interaction of
voucher programs’ increased popularity and states’ increased
willingness to fund them that Mead exploits to support her conclusion
that “[s]tate constitutions have clearly established that children have a
genuine right to a quality public education, not merely the privilege to
shop for schooling in the educational marketplace.”4
Just to be clear—and this central point bears repetition—Mead’s
argument seeks to transform voucher programs’ increased popularity,
and state governments’ increased willingness to fund them, into
reasons to limit voucher programs rather than expand them. Or, a
more modest form of Mead’s thesis is that regardless of what happens
to voucher programs, struggling traditional public schools need more,
rather than less funding that results partly from a diminishing share of
students served by traditional public schools.
Perhaps even more important than Mead’s argument itself,
however, is that the structure of her argument implies an overly
constrained understanding of publicly funded vouchers and their
relation to a student’s right to an adequate education. That is, Mead’s
argument understands publicly funded vouchers through the lens of
only those children who attend public schools (as well as public
schools’ numerous institutional interests and constituencies, including
teacher unions).
Of course, other lenses exist and publicly funded voucher programs
are capable of far more nuanced and granular understandings than
Mead’s Article emphasizes. For example, one alternative way to
understand publicly funded voucher programs is to consider how they
provide some—perhaps many—students with their only meaningful
access to an adequate education. This is certainly the case for far too
many students, many of whom are students of color or from lowincome households, or both, and assigned to “failing” or

2. Id. at 728.
3. Id. at 737.
4. Id. at 743.
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“inadequate” public schools.5 Finally, efforts to limit school choice,
particularly in today’s No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB)6
motivated intensive standardized test environment, imply an
awareness of adverse selection, a core insurance law doctrine.7 And
partly in an effort to ward off more “educational death spirals,” those
defending public schools, such as Professor Mead, seek to limit
alternative educational options and diminish the ability to exit failing
(or successful) public schools. The desired background goal—to
dampen the increasing number of public schools lurching towards an
“educational death spiral”—however, will continue to confront
substantial headwinds. Unlike, for example, the individual mandate
provision in the Affordable Care Act (ACA),8 which is singularly
essential to what the ACA seeks to accomplish as an insurance
instrument, a similar “individual mandate” is simply not
constitutionally possible in the education context.
Thus, even if the core argument in Mead’s Article succeeded and
public financial support for voucher programs diminished, such an
outcome would only indirectly assist the struggling public schools
Mead seeks to aid.9 On the one hand, it is certainly plausible that
public schools would receive increased funding (funding otherwise
committed to voucher programs). On the other hand, however, while
reducing one exit option from struggling public schools, it would not
eliminate other exit options.10 To the extent that struggling public

5. See generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING
MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 25–28 (2001); James E.
Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999).
6. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
7. In the insurance law context, adverse selection “typically refers to the
(theoretical) tendency for high-risk people to be more interested in insurance than
low-risk people are.” THOMAS BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 12 (3d ed. 2013). See generally Tom Baker,

Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, in
RISK AND MORALITY (Richard Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003). In the education
context, adverse selection involves the tendency for high-achieving students to seek
high-performing schools.
8. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010), amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20,
26, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
9. See Mead, supra note 1, at 736–38.
10. That is, parents with the financial ability to do so may still elect for their
children to exit public schools in favor of private schools. Moreover, the increasing
popularity of public charter schools provides another exit option from struggling
public schools. See infra note 18.
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schools need not only more funding, as Mead implies,11 but also to
attract and retain the very types of students inclined and motivated to
exit struggling public schools, reducing public support for voucher
programs will only reduce, but not eliminate, avenues to exit failing
public schools. Moreover, reducing access to voucher programs as an
exit option will also disproportionately harm students from lowincome households and exacerbate differences between public and
private school profiles.12 While the Constitution permits states to
compel education, it does not permit states to compel (or “mandate”)
public-only education.13 Consequently, adverse selection will persist
as a threat to public schools unable to deliver satisfactory education
services.
I. WHAT TO INFER FROM INCREASINGLY POPULAR VOUCHER
PROGRAMS?
Professor Mead’s Article nicely inventories the surprising recent
growth of publicly funded voucher programs as well as various
“voucher-like” programs.14 In Table 1, Mead rightly emphasizes that
twenty states now have some form of a publicly funded voucher
program and “fifteen programs have been enacted since just 2013.”15
This recent surge will not surprise families participating in voucher
programs. It will surprise few, if any, to learn that the survey data
from those participating in voucher programs convey genuine
enthusiasm.16 Of course, self-selection assuredly explains much of
these results, as one would expect to detect enthusiasm for voucher
programs from those who willingly chose to participate in them.

11. See Mead, supra note 1, at 736.
12. Without access to publicly funded voucher programs, fewer children from
low-income households will benefit from the opportunity to attend private schools.
One consequence is that the absolute and relative percentage of low-income students
attending private schools will drop.
13. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
14. See Mead, supra note 1, at 707.
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Janet R. Beales & Maureen Wahl, Private Vouchers in Milwaukee:
The PAVE Program, in PRIVATE VOUCHERS 57–59 (Terry M. Moe ed., 1995)
(providing data on participating parental support of the Milwaukee program); see
also Michael Heise et al., Private Vouchers in Indianapolis: The Golden Rule
Program, in PRIVATE VOUCHERS, supra, at 113 (providing data on participating
parental support of the Indianapolis program).
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More telling, perhaps, is the more generalized increased demand for
greater education options.17
Notwithstanding participants’ unsurprising enthusiasm for school
voucher programs, the spike in the growth of the publicly funded
voucher programs that Mead describes will likely surprise many,
particularly when assessed in light of the even more pronounced and
sustained growth of charter schools during the past decades.18 One
source of surprise flows from the sustained, persistent, and important
forces that act against publicly funded voucher programs. Public
school teacher unions supply one predictable, vocal, and powerful
source of opposition to publicly funded voucher programs.19 Indeed,
the nation’s two leading teacher unions, the National Education
Association and the American Federation of Teachers, benefit from
“vast resources, huge memberships, pervasive political clout, and by
almost any estimate are among the most powerful interest groups in
all of American politics.”20 That teacher unions typically—and
enthusiastically—oppose publicly funded voucher programs will
surprise few. Non-public schools pose an important threat to union
membership and parochial union interests to the extent that these
schools and their growth threaten to redirect public resources away
from public schools and toward private schools. Thus, teacher union
opposition to voucher programs is both obvious and well-understood.

17. See, e.g., Dominick DiRocco, Note, Making the Grade: School Choice Comes
to New Jersey, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 281, 283 (1997) (observing that “public
demand for school choice is at an all time high in the United States”). Consistent,
stable data on general public support for voucher programs, however, are more
elusive. See TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 252–
55 (2001). More recent studies have provided additional data in this area of study.
See, e.g., William G. Howell et al., The Public Weighs in on School Reform, EDUC.
NEXT, Fall 2011, at 11, 16–19.
18. From 1999–2000 to 2011–2012, the percentage of all public schools that were
public charter schools increased from 1.7% to 5.8%, and the total number of public
charter schools increased from 1500 to 5700. As well, charter schools have generally
increased in enrollment size over time. From 1999–2000 to 2011–2012, the number of
students enrolled in public charter schools increased from 0.3 million to 2.1 million
students. During these same years, the percentage of public school students who
attended charter schools increased from 0.7% to 4.2%. Finally, from 2010–2011 to
2011–2012, the number of students enrolled in public charter schools increased from
1.8 million to 2.1 million. See Fast Facts: Charter Schools, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC.
STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=30 (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
19. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Krisbergh, Marginalizing Organized Educators: The
Effect of School Choice and ‘No Child Left Behind’ On Teacher Unions, 8 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 1025, 1034–36 (2006) (describing teacher unions as among school
voucher programs most vocal critics).
20. See MOE, supra note 17, at 2.
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Yet other factors also fuel opposition to publicly funded voucher
programs. One such factor involves the public’s overall satisfaction
with public schools. As Professor Terry Moe notes, public opinion
data, at least through the year 2000, tends to suggest that on average
Americans are “fairly satisfied” with public education.21 Even if the
American public opinion was somehow mistaken, many Americans
are financially incented towards satisfaction with public schools.
After all, in many suburban contexts, particularly suburbs that benefit
from high-performing public schools, home prices reflect the
perceived (and real) efficacy of the local public schools.22 Thus, if
nothing else, suburban homeowners possess an important economic
incentive that tilts them toward satisfaction with their local public
schools and, as well, against public support for private schools that
might compete against their public schools.
Ambivalence or antipathy towards publicly funded voucher
programs, whatever its source or sources, is not confined to
abstractions and is evidenced in concrete ways. For example, forces
working against publicly funded school voucher programs have
coalesced and fueled significant and persistent political losses for
school voucher proposals placed on ballots.23 It would be easy, indeed
too easy, to ascribe voucher programs’ ballot initiative losses to
teacher union political opposition alone. To be sure, teacher unions
are among voucher programs’ most vocal and organized critics. But
responsibility for voucher proposals’ political losses is more
accurately shared by a convergence of allied interests. Among the
less-appreciated opponents of voucher programs is suburban
opposition, especially suburbs that benefit from well-functioning and
desirable public schools.24
Thus, the publicly funded voucher programs’ recent and notable
legislative success that Mead documents25 becomes far more notable

21. See MOE, supra note 17, at 70.
22. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School
Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2081 (2002); David D. Troutt, Ghettoes Revisited:
Antimarkets, Consumption, and Empowerment, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000)
(noting that “[t]he reputation of the schools, in turn, adds to the value of their
homes”); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Selected Skirmishes: Class Warfare, REASON
(Feb. 1, 1997), http://reason.com/archives/1997/02/01/class-warfare/print (calling this
“the ugly financial story lurking behind the soccer-mom pandering on education”).
23. See Mead, supra note 1, at 705. An interesting puzzle emerges, however,
when one compares voucher programs’ lack of success on ballot initiatives with their
growing legislatives successes. Id.
24. For an extended discussion of this point, see generally Ryan & Heise, supra
note 22.
25. See Mead, supra note 1, at 708 tbl.1.
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when this growth is nested into a general political context noted for
indifference, at best, toward voucher programs. The politics that
surround voucher programs continue to shift, and they are shifting in
directions more amenable to voucher proponents. That is to say,
what is notable about the voucher program growth that Mead’s
Article documents is that it exists, notwithstanding considerable and
sustained political hostility.26
What can one reasonably infer from the recent growth in public
support (and public financial support) for voucher programs that the
Mead Article documents? Clearly, any such growth is both relatively
recent and, candidly, quite modest.27 As such, any inferences should
be similarly modest. If nothing else, recent developments imply that
the political context surrounding the school voucher debate is
evolving, and the velocity of change is increasing. That the political
impulse for publicly funded voucher programs frequently stems from
concerns for students—and their families—otherwise trapped in
struggling public schools remains particularly telling.28 Moreover, one
of the NCLB’s palpable legacies, discussed more fully below, involves
an educational climate increasingly dominated by standardized
testing.29 While reasonable minds can, and do, differ on the
substantive policy merits of increased standardized testing, such
testing, combined with affirmative annual reporting requirements, has
made the performance of schools far more transparent and accessible
to parents.30 Making objective and salient information about school
(and student) performance more accessible and transparent

26. Mead echoes the widely acknowledged fact that “publicly funded private
school voucher programs have not fared well when placed on ballots . . . .” Id. at 705.
27. For example, while the Supreme Court concluded in 2002 that publicly funded
voucher programs did not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 639 (2002), Professor Mead identified only twentyfour states that have enacted some form of a publicly funded voucher, or voucherlike, program since then. See Mead, supra note 1, at 707, 708 tbl.1.
28. See, e.g., CLINT BOLICK, VOUCHER WARS: WAGING THE LEGAL BATTLE OVER
SCHOOL CHOICE 15–43 (2003) (describing Polly Williams’ efforts to lead a school
voucher campaign in Milwaukee, Wisconsin).
29. See, e.g., Marc Pilotin, Finding a Common Yardstick: Implementing a

National Student Assessment and School Accountability Plan Through State-Federal
Collaboration, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 545, 545 (2010) (noting that “[s]tandardized testing
permeates American public education”).
30. Compare Diane Ravitch, Get Congress Out of the Classroom, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2007, at A25 (noting that NCLB “has unleashed an unhealthy obsession with
standardized testing”), with Thomas F. Risberg, Note, National Standards and Tests:

The Worst Solution to America’s Educational Problems . . . Except for All the
Others, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890 (2011) (arguing that national standards and
assessments is the least bad policy option).
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contributes to increased parental demands for greater control over
their children’s educational futures.31 An increase in parental
demands for control over their children’s schools has fueled an
increase in political demands for greater access to private education
markets and schools.32 Thus, at the very least, one plausible inference
from the growth in publicly funded voucher programs that Mead’s
Article illustrates is that the public demand for more access to private
schools is both increasing and becoming increasingly successful
politically.
II. REFRAMING THE RELATION BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL
OBLIGATIONS AND VOUCHERS
Professor Mead’s Article construes publicly funded vouchers as a
threat to adequate public education, partly because of the resulting
diversion of resources away from public and toward private schools.33
The main threat to “regular” public schools—funding—comes into
sharper relief when one accounts for practical fiscal realities.
Specifically, Mead’s Article identifies the greater absolute and
relative share of public education funds now going to voucherrecipient schools that otherwise (presumably) would have gone to
public schools. This allocation jeopardizes the public schools’ ability
to discharge their duty to provide students with “adequate”
educational services.34 Having argued that publicly funded voucher
programs threaten public schools’ ability to deliver a stateconstitutionally required “adequate” education, Mead goes on to
conclude that where such a threat exists, state constitutions must
preference public school funding over funding for voucher
programs.35
The central move in Mead’s Article—asserting that state
constitutions in general, and their education clauses in particular,
preference adequate public schools over publicly funded voucher
programs—warrants attention for conceptual and empirical reasons.
First, as a conceptual matter, Mead’s move implies a narrow and one31. See, e.g., Mike Johnston, From Regulation to Results: Shifting American
Education from Inputs to Outcomes, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 195, 196 (noting how
NCLB empowered parents in part by increasing transparency of student academic
performance).
32. See, e.g., Howell et al., supra note 17, at 16 fig.4, 17–19.
33. See, e.g., Mead, supra note 1, at 737 (noting that data “suggests that future
challenges to [publicly funded] voucher, tax credit scholarship programs, and
education savings account programs may take the form of school finance litigation”).
34. Id. at 739.
35. Id.
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dimensional understanding of the relation between voucher programs
and state constitutional guarantees for an adequate education. By
framing the understanding in the manner that she does, Professor
Mead ignores the possibility that publicly funded voucher programs
may provide some students with their only meaningful access to an
adequate education.36 And this would be particularly true for those
children assigned to struggling traditional public schools.37 Second, as
an empirical matter, it does not necessarily follow that “inadequate”
public schools will become “adequate” solely with the infusion of
additional funds. To some (admittedly unknown) degree, such factors
as, for example, student peer effects, also contribute to a schools’
efficacy and student academic achievement outcomes independent of
funding levels.38 And, to the extent that non-funding variables
contribute to school adequacy, Mead’s Article does not fully account
for them and their potential influence.
A. Alternative Ways to Frame Publicly Funded Voucher
Programs
Mead’s Article frames the relation between voucher programs and
state constitutional guarantees for adequate education in only one
direction. Specifically, Mead understands voucher programs as
generating a threat to or impeding public schools’ ability to deliver a
state constitutionally required adequate education.39
Voucher
programs’ relation to adequate educational guarantees, however, is
far more complex and nuanced than Mead’s Article suggests. Indeed,
one can just as easily and plausibly understand voucher programs as a
policy instrument that can increase—not decrease—access to
adequate education. And this alternative way to understand voucher
programs is especially apt for sub-groups of students not presently
well-served by public schools.
To illustrate this point, let us adopt, for example, the perspective of
a student who, through no fault or choice of her own, finds herself
born into a low-income household that lacks the full array of

36. Indeed, to take but one example, Ohio initiated a publicly funded voucher
program for the city of Cleveland, as the Supreme Court noted in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, to provide “educational assistance to poor children in a
demonstrably failing public school system . . . .” 536 U.S. 639, 640 (2002).
37. Cf. id. (noting that Ohio enacted its voucher program to educationally assist
poor children in demonstrably failing public school systems).
38. For a brief summary of the related technical literature, see Richard D.
Kahlenberg, Learning from James Coleman, PUB. INT., Summer 2001, at 54.
39. See Mead, supra note 1, at 736–38.
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educational assets typically (but by no means exclusively) found in
middle- and upper-income households and neighborhoods. Let us
further assume that this low-income student resides at a specific
address served by a local public school previously adjudicated by the
state’s supreme court as (state) constitutionally “inadequate.” To
bring this thought experiment fully within the scope of the issues
raised by the Mead Article, let us also assume that a fully accredited,
academically thriving, private (and tuition-charging) school operates
across the street from the student’s struggling and “inadequate”
public school. That our hypothetical student is legally entitled to
discharge her state required compulsory education obligations by
attending the private school is uncontested, as the Supreme Court in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters makes this option unambiguously clear.40
Exercising her “Pierce option,” however, requires a degree of
disposable income that this student’s family simply cannot afford.
Thus, as our student cannot attend the private school absent a
publicly funded voucher program, she finds herself legally compelled
to attend an inadequate public school.
Sadly, indeed, tragically, the scenario described above is not merely
an academic thought experiment. The “scenario” is reality for far too
many students across the United States. From the perspective of this
student—and the many other students who live this reality every
day—a publicly funded voucher program serves as an education “life
boat” and a literal, concrete means to access a quality education.
Given her family’s limited financial means, a publicly funded voucher
program is functionally the only way she can exit a failing or
inadequate public school that she is otherwise legally required to
attend. Thus, such voucher programs can contribute to a net increase
in the number of students served by adequate schools. What Mead
characterizes as an “extra educational expenditure,”41 is certainly not
understood as “extra” for those students who need public subsidies to
access successful private schools. Thus, for financially needy students,
particularly those relegated to failing public schools, publicly funded
voucher programs can help ensure that they receive something
approximating equal educational opportunity.
Even more perplexing is that Mead’s Article understands the
threat posed by publicly funded voucher programs from the
perspective of public schools and public school districts, noting, as did
the Ohio Supreme Court, that publicly funded voucher programs,
40. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 534–35 (1925).
41. Mead, supra note 1, at 736 (emphasis in original).
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“‘should not come at the expense of our public education system or
our public school teachers.’”42 Even if voucher programs diluted
public education school funding, positive rights to an adequate
education enshrined in state constitutions or education clauses attach
to individual students—not a “public school system,”43 public school
teachers, or administrators. Indeed, in typical school finance (or
“adequacy”) litigation, public schools and districts are among those
named as defendants, not plaintiffs. While reasonable minds can—
and frequently do44—differ on just what is meant by an “adequate”
education, it simply cannot be understood as—or reduced to—a jobs
protection act for the benefit of public school teacher unions.
For the sake of argument, however, let us grant Mead’s conclusion
that states must first “adequately” fund their public schools before
committing public funds to voucher programs and then consider likely
consequences.45 One immediate consequence, of course, is that our
hypothetical student described above would lose access to a thriving
private school and, instead, be legally obligated to attend an
“inadequate” public school. But what would not happen is equally
important and instructive.
Specifically, as Mead correctly
acknowledges, students benefitting from households that can afford
private school tuition still retain their ability to exit failing public
schools for more desirable private schools.46 Thus, while Mead’s
conclusion will result in fewer people exiting public for private
schools, it will only do so for students whose families lack the
resources to pay for private school tuition absent a state subsidy.
Some student cohorts, notably middle- and upper-income students, as
well as motivated students able to secure alternative ways to finance
private school education, will retain their ability to exit public schools.
Paradoxically, such students may possess important human capital
that public schools, especially struggling public schools, seek to attract
and retain.47 Such students, however, remain outside of the reach of
Mead’s conclusion.

42. Id. at 728 (quoting Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio 1999)).
43. See id. at 737, 739–40.
44. See, e.g., Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66
STAN. L. REV. 477, 477 (2014) (noting that debates about “equal” or “adequate”
education have persisted for decades).
45. See Mead, supra note 1, at 737–38.
46. See id. at 743 (stating “[i]t is certainly true that parents may not be compelled
to enroll their children in public schools”).
47. See generally Christopher Lubienski & Peter Weitzel, Choice, Integration,

and Educational Opportunity: Evidence on Competitive Incentives for Student
Sorting in Charter Schools, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 351, 352–53 (2009) (noting

756
B.

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

Money as a Partial Solution for Struggling Public Schools

Even if the concerns expressed in Mead’s Article about the
deleterious fiscal consequences to public schools posed by publicly
funded voucher programs are correct, such concerns are incomplete,
as they do not adequately reflect the rich array of non-fiscal variables
frequently associated with desired student academic outcomes. As a
full review of decades of sophisticated, technical, and empirical
literature resides beyond the scope of this Essay, what follows
endeavors only to quickly describe the basic contours of this
literature.
While for many policymakers involved in education reform efforts
the ultimate barometer of success or failure is student academic
achievement, precisely what causes some students to perform well
and others less well remains hotly debated and not well understood.48
Thus far, a loose consensus lands on the importance of peer effects on
student academic achievement and social behavior.49 While there is
emerging agreement that good teachers, strong principals, small
schools, small class sizes, and parental involvement can improve
student achievement, the significance of these variables and their
complex interactions remain contested.50 Added to these specific
areas of debate is the more general and lingering dispute over the
extent to which expenditures correlate with achievement—that is,
over whether money “matters” in the school context and, if so, how
might it matter.51

how the “mix” of social characteristics in a school can influence key outcomes,
including student achievement).
48. For a recent discussion, see, for example, Wendy Parker, The Failings of
Education Reform and the Promise of Integration, 90 TEX. L. REV. 395, 408–09
(2011) (reviewing JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY,
TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN
AMERICA (2010)).
49. James Coleman was the first to report this, in his famous 1966 study for the
(now) Department of Education, which has since become known simply as “The
Coleman Report.” JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (1966) (studying student achievement and finding stronger correlation
between student achievement and nonschool factors than between achievement and
school factors). Scores of subsequent studies have confirmed Coleman’s conclusion.
For citations to the literature, see KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 25–28; Ryan, supra
note 5, at 286–87, nn.165-66.
50. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 22, at 2102–03; see also KAHLENBERG, supra
note 5, at 36–37.
51. For research generally skeptical of a correlation between educational
spending and educational achievement, see ERIC A. HANUSHEK ET AL., MAKING
SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTS 25–48 (1994);
ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE O. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
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Setting aside such long-standing debates, what is reasonably clear is
that something as complex as student academic achievement almost
assuredly does not pivot on any single variable, such as school funding
in general or marginal school funding diverted to private schools
through publicly funded voucher programs in particular.52 Equally
clear is that schools with a high concentration of students from lowincome households rarely, if ever, perform as well as their middleclass counterparts.53 This generally holds true even when substantial
resources are provided to these schools.54 Although several reasons
explain why this might be so, one key point is the clear and
undisputed one that, for an array of complex reasons, schools noted
for concentrations of student poverty rarely realize their potential.55
Thus, while policymakers’ focus on school funding is hardly inapt, a
belief that funding levels alone can influence academic achievement
ignores the rich complexity of variables that inform student academic
achievement.
III. ADVERSE SELECTION AND DEATH SPIRALS: THE NCLB,
ACA, AND SCHOOL VOUCHER O PPOSITION
One standard critique advanced against school voucher programs,
publicly or privately funded, is that they risk “skimming” away from
public and towards private schools those students comparatively
better-positioned and motivated for academic success.56 At its core,
the “skimming” argument contains two critical components and

277–81 (Lane Akers ed., 1992); Eric A. Hanushek, The Impact of Differential
Expenditures on School Performance, EDUC. RESEARCHER, May 1989, at 45, 48–50.
For research generally supportive of such a correlation, see Ronald F. Ferguson,
Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465, 483–90 (1991); Larry V. Hedges et al., Does Money Matter?

A Meta-Analysis of Studies of the Effects of Differential School Inputs on Student
Outcomes, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Apr. 2014, at 5, 13.
52. See generally KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 36–37 (discussing factors that
studies have shown are more closely linked to student achievement than increased
school spending).
53. For a fuller account of this point, see Ryan & Heise, supra note 22, at 2103–08.
54. See id. at 2106–08; see also Michael Heise, Litigated Learning, Law’s Limits,
and Urban School Reform Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1419, 1447–53 (2007) (noting
that a shift from school finance litigation strategy from equity to adequacy reflected,
in part, that per pupil spending in many under-performing urban schools exceeded
state per pupil spending means).
55. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 22, at 2103–08.
56. See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education?
Emerging Evidence from Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 839, 855 (2007) (voicing concerns over skimming effects resulting from
school choice policies).
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pivots on a doctrine, adverse selection, which is central to, among
other enterprises, insurance markets. First, public school advocates
typically complain that voucher programs drain public schools of
some of their highest-achieving and most motivated students (and
their households).57 What is frequently left unstated in polite, public
conversation, yet logically necessarily follows, is the implication that
those students “left behind” in public schools disproportionately
include students who are comparatively less academically competitive
or motivated or those who are more difficult (and expensive) to
educate.58 This is particularly bothersome to public schools now that
public and private schools increasingly compete for students.
A second related, though distinct, component—flowing from the
first—is that the steady departure of a public school’s comparatively
more motivated students may fundamentally alter a school’s internal
dynamics in two potentially important (and damaging) ways
consistent with what adverse selection would predict. First, the
departure of a school’s most able and motivated student cohort may
prompt that school’s next most able and motivated cohort to leave as
well.59 And so on. Second, if so, at some point the increasing
diminution of an absolute and relative number of able and motivated
students itself will transform a school’s academic culture, climate, and
political clout in less than desirable ways.60 A degradation of a
school’s academic culture or climate might launch a school into an
education “death spiral” and hasten a “race to the bottom.”61 Once
ignited, education death-spirals are difficult to arrest and reverse, as
they feed on their own self-generated destructive centripetal forces.62
Once again, for the sake of argument, let us simply assume the
plausibility of the threat posed by adverse selection critique
exacerbated by publicly funded school voucher programs. Whatever
the adverse consequences to public schools may have been in the
past, the implementation of NCLB dramatically increased them. To
help accomplish its many statutory goals, NCLB requires states to

57. See, e.g., id. at 840.
58. See id. at 840, 851–56. This point is also discussed by Professor Mead. See
Mead, supra note 1, at 740–41.
59. See generally Forman, supra note 56.
60. See id. at 840.
61. For an early discussion of how adverse selection can trigger a “death-spiral” in
insurance markets, see, for example, David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser,
Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, 1 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1, 8 (1998).
62. See generally id; PETER W. COOKSON, JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE
FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 91–93 (1994); Ryan & Heise, supra note 22,
at 2092.
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develop and self-impose challenging academic standards,63 annually
test students to assess progress toward state standards,64 and gather
and disseminate relevant information to parents and others.65 A
requirement that schools must demonstrate adequate yearly progress
or face increasingly onerous sanctions resides at the heart of NCLB.66
As a consequence, while a greater number of students and, ideally, a
greater number of academically proficient students were traditionally
deemed an asset to public school districts, the possibility of adverse
consequences from NCLB flowing from not enough students
demonstrating “adequate” academic progress made attracting—and
retaining—proficient students an even higher priority for public
school districts.67
Insurance markets understand well the almost existential threat
posed by adverse selection and how it can trigger “death spirals.”68
Indeed, at the heart of the insurance market enterprise are tasks—
risk-pooling and rating—designed to blunt the ill-effects of adverse
selection.69 Indeed, those who helped draft President Obama’s
signature health insurance legislation, the ACA, understood this
point better than most. Those who crafted the ACA’s structural
design understood well the essential need to compel, under force of
law, participation in the health insurance pools through the individual

63. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301(1) (2012).
64. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(G).
65. See id. § 6311(h); see also Michael Heise, Courting Trouble: Litigation, High
Stakes Testing, and Education Policy, 42 IND. L. REV. 327, 330–31 (2009) (discussing
the NCLB requirements).
66. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6316(b)(5), (8) (2012).
67. See generally id; James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left
Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2004).
68. A balanced risk pool is necessary for insurance instruments to work. In the
health insurance context, for example, a health insurance company’s enrollment must
contain a balance of relatively healthy (less costly) and unhealthy (more costly)
individuals. A risk pool dominated by unhealthy enrollees will exert upward pressure
on premium costs. Increasing premium costs, however, will induce the marginally
healthier enrollees to exit and seek a less costly health insurance policy. The
departure of the marginally healthier enrollees fuels even more premium price
increases and, again, more departures of the marginally healthier enrollees. Such a
“death spiral,” once triggered, is self-propelled. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham et al.,
Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 195, 204–05
n.28 (2014); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An
Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1224 (2004). For a discussion of the “death
spiral” potential in the ACA context, see, for example, Mark A. Hall, Evaluating the
Affordable Care Act: The Eye of the Beholder, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1029, 1039 (2014).
69. See BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 7.
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mandate to help generate the necessary heterogeneous risk pool.70 A
heterogeneous risk pool was—and remains—a fundamental necessity
to insure that enough premium-paying healthy participants would be
able to cross-subsidize their less-healthy counterparts now that health
insurance companies’ ability to define and manage risk pools was
limited by the ACA.71 Indeed, wholly independent of one’s views of
the constitutional integrity of the Supreme Court’s recent decision to
uphold the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate
provision in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius,72 few—if any—observers seriously contested the empirical
proposition that without the individual mandate the ACA would
structurally implode.73
While individual mandates may be able to compel participation in
health insurance markets within the ACA context, such mandates are
clearly not possible in the education context. To be more precise,
while compulsory education laws across the states are, of course,
certainly permissible, as Pierce made clear, what Pierce also made
crystal clear is that states may not compel public education.74 That is,
families remain free to discharge their affirmative educational
obligations through public or private schools. And even if states
could compel public-only education, states cannot mandate where
people live, and the Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley illustrates
Thus, the
judicial deference to school district boundaries.75
interactive effect of the Pierce and Milliken decisions all but

70. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012)
(the “individual mandate”). For a discussion of why the individual mandate is
essential to address critical adverse selection problems, see Abigail R. Moncrieff,

Cost-Benefit Federalism: Reconciling Collective Action Federalism and Libertarian
Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation and Beyond, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 288 (2012).
71. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-4 (2012) (prohibiting health insurance
companies from denying coverage due to an applicant’s pre-existing conditions); 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-14 (2012) (requiring health insurance companies to provide coverage
for young adults on their parents’ policies through age twenty six); see also Rebecca
E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1367 (2011).
72. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
73. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80
TENN. L. REV. 763, 812 (2013) (“[N]o one disputed that the very reason for the
ACA’s individual mandate was to make the broader legislation work without
bankrupting the insurance companies . . . .”); see also Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2625
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
74. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 534–35 (1925).
75. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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precludes the government’s ability to mandate public school
attendance in the same manner the federal government now
mandates participation in health insurance markets.
Thus, while faltering public schools—similar to insurance
markets—are exposed to adverse selection risks, and NCLB sanctions
enhance the consequences to faltering public schools, neither public
school administrators nor government officials possess the legal
authority to prevent children from departing struggling public schools
(at least those who benefit from the ability to depart struggling public
schools for other schools). Consequently, the adverse selection threat
to struggling public schools is both real in theory and obvious in
reality.
Public school advocates, including Professor Mead, appear
increasingly sensitive to the adverse consequences, deepened by
NCLB, that flow from a family’s right to exit struggling schools, even
though such flight may exacerbate a public school’s struggles.
Lacking the constitutional ability to blunt adverse selection’s illeffects on public schools by mandating that families enroll their
children in public schools, public school advocates turn to efforts to
reduce access to the private school market.76 One such effort,
reflected in the Mead Article, is to reduce public financial support for
voucher programs.77 Of course, those children lucky enough to be
born into wealthy families are all but immune from such reductions
and retain the ability to exit private for public schools.
CONCLUSION
Professor Mead’s Article casts helpful and important light on the
unexpected recent growth in publicly funded voucher programs.
Given the political opposition such programs reflexively stimulate,
the recent surge in legislative support warrants note. That such
programs appear to be gaining political popularity illustrates not only
the ever-shifting politics surrounding education policy, but also the
public’s growing frustration with the inability of too many public
schools to generate and deliver adequate education services.

76. Arguments, such as the one advanced by Professor Mead, that seek to
preference the interests of public schools over those of students and their parents
who seek greater access to private school through publicly funded voucher programs,
illustrate this impulse.
77. Indeed, Mead argues that publicly funded voucher programs are proper only
after “adequate financial resources are first directed to the public schools.” Mead,
supra note 1, at 737.
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Efforts to enlist the growing popularity of publicly funded voucher
programs into the service of arguments to reduce public support for
voucher programs, such as Mead’s, strike me as unpersuasive. The
core of Mead’s Article reflects an unduly narrow conception of the
relation between voucher programs and educational adequacy, to say
nothing of aspirations for greater equal educational opportunity.
Mead’s argument also privileges the parochial self-interests of public
schools and public school teachers over the interests of children and
families seeking greater education options. Finally, to the extent that
efforts to reduce available education options reflects growing
concerns about adverse selection’s consequences for public schools,
Mead’s argument falls short. Unlike in the health insurance context,
where federal law can compel citizen participation in health insurance
markets, no such similar legal instrument exists in the education
context. While Mead’s argument indirectly seeks to reduce flight
from failing public schools, it cannot eliminate flight from public
schools by those families fortunate enough to have the ability to
exercise school choice without a public subsidy.
Years ago I wrote that while social science remains unable to
explain why too many schoolchildren do not achieve desired
academic performance levels, the failures themselves are hauntingly
easy to predict.78 Sadly—even tragically—what Professor Howard
Gardner observed in 2000 remains in full force today: “Tell me the
ZIP code of a child and I will predict her chances of college
completion and probable income; add the elements of family support
(parental, grandparental, ethnic and religious values) and a few
degrees of freedom remain, at least in our country.”79
That Professor Gardner’s alarming observation exists—let alone
persists—should trouble anyone who seeks to plausibly harbor a
belief in America’s ideal of equal educational opportunity. To the
extent that equal educational opportunity means anything, it must at
the very least mean that ZIP codes should not predict a child’s
educational destiny. As such, education policy makers should seek
policies that contribute to and expand, rather than impede or limit,
avenues toward greater equality of educational opportunity.

78. See Michael Heise, Choosing Equal Educational Opportunity: School
Reform, Law, and Public Policy, 68 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1136 (2001).
79. Howard Gardner, Paroxysms of Choice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 19, 2000, at
49.

